SIM, Seung-Gyu
   Department   Aoyama Gakuin University  Department of International Economics, School of International Politics, Economics and Communication
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2020/11
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title Technology licensing and environmental policy instruments: Price control versus quantity control
Contribution Type Collaboration
Journal Resource and Energy Economics
Journal TypeAnother Country
Publisher Elsevier
Volume, Issue, Page 62
Author and coauthor Seung-Gyu Sim and Sungwan Hong
Details This paper analyzes the welfare implications of abatement technology licensing under taxation and emission trading schemes. We demonstrate that a firm with a better abatement technology optimally sells a per-unit royalty license to a competitor under both schemes but offers a higher royalty rate under the latter. The emission trading scheme may outperform the taxation scheme regarding social surplus by inducing more production by the licensor and less production by the licensee. These are reversals of the welfare implications suggested by the literature that adopts a partial equilibrium approach or omits either the market for the advanced technology or the final goods.