SIM, Seung-Gyu
   Department   Aoyama Gakuin University  Department of International Economics, School of International Politics, Economics and Communication
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2015/03
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title Price Discrimination and Sequential Contracting in Monopolistic Input Market
Contribution Type Collaboration
Journal Economics Letters
Journal TypeAnother Country
Publisher Elsevier
Volume, Issue, Page 128,pp.39-42
Author and coauthor Hyunchul Kim and Seung-Gyu Sim
Details This paper examines the welfare implication of banning price discrimination in the intermediate goods market in which a monopolistic supplier contracts with asymmetric downstream retailers. We demonstrate that the supplier has a strong incentive to manipulate the interdependent demand structure through sequential contracting whether price discrimination is banned or not, and allowing price discrimination improves social welfare and consumer surplus when sequential contracting is implemented by the supplier.