MIYAGISHIMA Kaname
   Department   Aoyama Gakuin University  Department of Economics, College of Economics
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2019/01
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title Fair criteria for social decisions under uncertainty
Contribution Type Single
Journal Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal TypeAnother Country
Publisher ELSEVIER
Volume, Issue, Page 80,pp.77-87
Details In a simple model where agents have ordinal and interpersonally noncomparable subjective expected utility preferences over uncertain future incomes, we analyze the implications of equity, efficiency, separability, and social rationality. Our efficiency conditions are fairly weak, because there are criticisms on the standard ex ante Pareto principle in the literature.Our social welfare criteria from the axioms satisfy ex ante equity, but violate Statewise Dominance, often referred to as ”the minimal criterion” of rationality under uncertainty.