MIYAGISHIMA Kaname
   Department   Aoyama Gakuin University  Department of Economics, College of Economics
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2023/07
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title Time-consistent fair social choice
Contribution Type Single
Journal Theoretical Economics
Journal TypeAnother Country
Volume, Issue, Page 18,pp.941-964
Details In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and, thus, the equity axiom is not compelling. Then we introduce another form of equity that takes the past into consideration and is compatible with time consistency. Using this form of equity and time consistency, we characterize maximin and leximin social welfare criteria that are history-dependent.
DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5220
URL for researchmap https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5220