シム　スンギュ   SIM, Seung-Gyu   沈　承揆    所属   青山学院大学  国際政治経済学部 国際経済学科    職種   教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2016/06
形態種別	学術雑誌
査読	査読あり
標題	The Most Favored Nation Principle: Passive Constraint on Active Commitment
執筆形態	共同
掲載誌名	Korean Economic Review
掲載区分	国外
出版社・発行元	Korean Economic Association
巻・号・頁	32(1),pp.77-99
著者・共著者	Jeongmeen Suh, Sihoon Nahm, and Seung-Gyu Sim
概要	This study examines how the welfare implication of the “most-favored-nation” (MFN) principle changed when the trade agreement mode shifted from a “one-shot-multilateral-trade-agreement” to “sequential-bilateral-trade-agreements.” It emphasizes that the MFN principle works as “passive constraints” in the former but “active commitments” in the latter. Under the sequential-bilateral-trade-agreements, (i) an importing country strategically takes a cost-efficient country as its first (second) trading partner when the MFN principle is (not) embedded, and (ii) embedding the MFN clause improves the trade surplus of the importing country and the world economy. This principle reverses the welfare implication in the existing literature. Finally, the importing country prefers the sequential agreements with the MFN clause to other cases in which it can choose simultaneous or sequential agreements with/without the MFN clause.